In modern academic philosophy, few would consider themselves Platonists. Of course, mathematicians may exhibit certain Platonic tendencies regarding the theory of mathematics, but as a whole, Platonism is no longer a popular philosophical school. In the realm of academia, substance essence metaphysics haven't been en vogue for decades, perhaps centuries. Yet despite this, continental philosophy, specifically its subsections that deal with social theory, are overwhelming Platonic in character. Despite the tendency of metaphysics after Heidegger to avoid dichotomies of "the truth" versus "the illusion," they have continued to persist in the realm of social theory.
Take, for instance, Lacan and "the real." What exactly "the real" is, has always been vague at some level, yet it obviously Platonic in nature. The world as we percieve it is a fractured version of the real, obscured by our subconcious biases. Only the real in itself has objective value. Of course, one could claim this is simply Kantian, but the claims regarding obscurity caused by errors in perception leads one more towards Plato.
As another example, take Judith Butler's claims regarding sexuality. She argues that pornography does not change sexual preferences and that it simply "brings out" the sexual tendencies one already had. In other words, Plato's theory of knowledge is transposed into sexuality. Sexuality is never added or changed from what one has at birth, it is simply uncovered in some way.
As a final example, take Debord and Baudrillard, with their ideas of the spectacle and the simulacrum, respectively. While they are obviously not the same, they do share a common viewpoint. That there is some sort of "true social reality" and that changes in the senses or the stimulus thereof, will cause this to falter. For every simulacrum, there is at least some original to which it is contrasted, in order for the term "simulacrum" to even apply in the first place
What does this mean? Well it means, first of all, that continental philosophy cannot lay claim of being Nietzschean, or any of the absurd claims of being "post-metaphysical." Platonic metaphysics, just like the trends in modern continental philosophy, assume a metaphysics of being and stability. While the world, our biases, and our cognitive faculties may obscure the real, turn social reality into a simulacra, be simulating a spectacle, or any of the other other ways of saying it, there is, at the end, some sort of true thing in itself at the end.
As such, we must reevaluate the interpretation of much of modern social theory. Instead of viewing it as a push to the future, perhaps going beyond metaphysics, social theory is, in reality, nearly traditionalist in its metaphysics. It operates under notions of objective reality, obscured faculties, and belief in the ability to open these faculties to greater perception, or at least the ability to do so potentially.
Is the entirety of modern social theory within the framework? To put it bluntly, that would be too simple. Gilles Deleuze, perhaps the most important metaphysician of modern continental philosophy, is nearly the exact opposite of a platonist. Yet even though this may be the case, the people with whom he is commonly associated do not share these common metaphysical ideas, whether conciously or not. Whereas Deleuze is the anti-dialectical think par excellence, social theory has not escaped such a paradigm (and as Deleuze accuses the dialectic, its traditional origins).
With this in mind, social theory will take either two paths. The first, retaining its commitment to the dialectic and its Platonist origins. If such is the case, one would expect social theory to gain conservative influence given the apparently similarity between its metaphysical backing and those of traditional religion (of course God is a subject for another debate, but the basic ontological presuppositions I what I imply by "metaphysical backing.") The second, gaining influence from Deleuze, rejects the dialectic, begins to collapse the dichotomy of "the real" versus "the illusion," and becomes increasingly more relativist. It is difficult to say which pattern shall arise, but upon the passing of Derrida, it seemed to have gone the latter. Yet with increasing conservative (specifically anti-capitalist nationalists or religious devotees) interest in thinkers like Adorno and Debord, the former has also gained a respectable following. Only time will tell for sure
It has become something of a cliche within the accelerationist movement to take the limit of transhumanism. What will our bodies be like in hundreds of years? How will our sensory organs adapt with new technologies? This is all well and good, but it ignores the fact of current reality. Without needing to add any prosthetic limbs or organ replacements, everyone is to some degree a cyborg already
Given the amount of time the average young person spends online, it is completely reasonable to consider him both a consumer of cybernetic capital and its product; after all, numerous content sorting algorithms having been designed not only to increase consumption, but also change the structure of desire. The first is obviously intentional, yet many well-meaning engineers may contest the second. Regardless, as the algorithm changes, so does our mind. This is not an absurd thing to say, given the amount of time spent online. As we use a website, our neuroplastic mind transforms itself into the algorithm in question. Thus, we are left something of a cyborg, the current state of our mind having been shaped by some software engineer.
Thus, it is for this reason that online communities as so often referred unto through the use of collective stereotypes. Reddit, twitter, 4chan, and Facebook all have a unique algorithm, and thus, all have produced a unique product in the genus of human capital.
To give examples for every media site would be superfluous. Regardless, it is abundantly clear that each website not only attracts specific users with its algorithm, but also reinforces certain psychological feedback loops. As time progress and the internet encroaches further within nearly every daily activity, the design of algorithms, despite hardly ever being discussed, is undoubtedly the most important part of each site. With each algorith, we are slowly reprogramming ourselves. Give it enough time and there will be no distinction. What could be more "Cybernetic" than that?
In discussions of ontology, the importance of the introduction cannot be understated. For the mind qua itself, prior to the introduction, the object of perception has no real existence. As a result, when the object comes into rational or empirical perception, what is apprehended? Is it the thing itself or some Idea? Likely not. I propose that it is the aggregate of previously connected ontologies. When I meet a doctor for the first time, I am not meeting him, so much as prior aggregates that share some sort of similarity. He is not himself, but rather, the sum of "him-ness" contained within each prior doctor I have met. If this new doctor is tall, his being, in relation to my mind, is composed of any tall doctor with whom I have interacted with in the past. If no such doctors exist, the shortest common ancestor follows another path back in the tree of ontological relations.
With this in mind, the importance of the parent cannot be overstated. In some way, all introductions trace their origin to the mother. After infancy, the first person the baby interacts with is analogue to its mother. The next, the aggregate of shared qualities in this newly expanded subset. As a result, to have been introduced to a multitude of experiences will increase the range of this subset, but never escape it. The parental origins always form the foundation of one's identity not only in being, but also in future epistemic introductions.
With this taken unto its absolute limit, it is apparent that this would result in some sort of primordial monism. There is one Monad with which lies the sum of potentiality. As one engages with phenomena, this subset of potentiality is increasingly actualized, broken down into greater subsets, and eventually reduced to pure quantity and division a la Guenon. However, the first experience (whether that be in one's life or in the universe as a whole), can never be exhausted. It is continually divided, yet always retains the ability to subsume what it had once split. Thus, it is no wonder that Alzheimer's patients do not just "get dumb" or "forget things" but often regress in life, becoming nearly child-like in desire. They have return to a prior point in this ontological division, in many ways achieving a more pure knowledge, the purity of which climaxes upon death with its flashbacks to infancy, paternal experiences, and conception(however, distasteful that may sound).